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Objectives: The objective of this study was to understand
the types of economic and quality-of-life promotional
claims the FDA considers false or misleading.
Methods: Publicly available FDA letters (n = 569) sent to
pharmaceutical companies from 1997 through 2001 for
inappropriate promotional claims were reviewed. A stan-
dard data collection form was developed, including six
categories for economic violations and three for QOL vio-
lations. For QOL, only letters with explicit violations 
for false or misleading claims using the words “quality 
of life” or patient “well-being” were considered. Other
information collected included type of regulatory letter
and media in which violations were found.
Results: Twenty-eight (4.9%) letters cited false and/or
misleading economic claims. The most common eco-
nomic violation was “unsupported comparative claim 
of effectiveness, safety, or interchangeability” (n = 14).
Twenty-eight (4.9%) letters cited QOL violations, of
which four contained both economic and QOL viola-
tions. The most common QOL violation was “lack of
substantial evidence for QOL claims” (n = 15). None 
of the FDA letters used the term “patient reported out-
comes.” Violations were found most frequently in
brochure and Web site-based promotions.
Conclusions: The body of evidence that is emerging illus-
trates how the FDA is regulating promotional material
containing misleading or unsubstantiated economic and
QOL claims. However, knowing what constitutes an
appropriate claim remains challenging because there are
no formal guidelines describing what constitutes a viola-
tion, nor what level of substantiating evidence is required.
More guidance may be needed to ensure appropriate use
of these claims in drug promotions.
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Actions by the Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) for inappropriate safety and/or efﬁcacy
claims by drug companies have recently generated
considerable public attention [1–4]. Although it has
not received as much attention, the FDA also regu-
lates promotional material containing economic
and quality-of-life (QOL) claims, such as a drug’s
cost-effectiveness or ability to improve quality of
life [5]. These types of promotional claims are
increasingly used by pharmaceutical companies to
promote their products [6,7].
Accurate and appropriate advertising claims can
provide valuable information about a drug to both
consumers and prescribers. Pharmacoeconomic
information may be particularly useful in the
current cost-conscious environment. Section 114 of
the Food and Drug Administration Modernization
Act of 1997 provides guidelines for dissemination
of health economic information to managed care
formulary committees and similar entities [8,9];
however, there are no federal guidelines that specify
the use of economic claims in promotions directed
at individual professionals (e.g., physicians, nurses,
pharmacists) and consumers. As a result, there may
be some confusion about what types of economic
claims are appropriate, including the level of evi-
dence required. There may also be confusion about
evidentiary requirements surrounding QOL claims.
In particular, the language surrounding QOL mea-
sures is often vague and may be difﬁcult to separate
from clinical improvements (i.e., “improved func-
tioning”) [5]. It also may be difﬁcult to determine
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whether improvements in only certain domains 
of QOL instruments versus improvement in all
domains are truly representative of improvements
in QOL.
We analyzed regulatory citations pertaining to
US-based advertising and promotional activities to
better understand the types of economic and QOL
claims the FDA considers false or misleading. Our
objectives were to determine the number and fre-
quency of economic and QOL claim violations, the
nature of the violations, and whether FDA remedial
actions taken by the companies on these types of
violations have increased over time.
In the United States, the Division of Drug 
Marketing, Advertising and Communications
(DDMAC), a unit of the FDA’s Center for Drug
Evaluation and Research (CDER), monitors and
reviews pharmaceutical promotions and takes
action against advertisements found to be “false,
lacking in fair balance, or otherwise misleading”
(FDA regulatory standards are set forth in the
various provisions of the Federal Food Drug and
Cosmetic Act and Code of Federal Regulations for
Prescription Drug Advertising and Labeling) [10].
All pharmaceutical promotional pieces distributed
in the United States must be submitted to DDMAC
at the time of initial dissemination, required under
FDA (regulation 21 C.F.R. Sect. 314.81b,3,I [April
28, 1002]) [11]. For those pieces that DDMAC con-
siders in violation of regulatory standards, action
may include either a warning letter or an untitled
letter of notice of violation, both of which detail
promotional pieces or practices that are in violation
of the law. The difference between warning letters
and untitled letters is that warning letters are more
serious than untitled letters, and failure to address
issues raised in warning letters may result in recalls,
seizures, injunctions, administrative detention, and
criminal prosecution [12–14].
Our analysis included all publicly available reg-
ulatory letters sent by the DDMAC to drug com-
panies between January 1997 and December 2001.
To our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst study to formally
evaluate regulatory letters issued on the basis of
economic and QOL claims.
Methods
Letters of Notice of Violation and Warning Letters
The CDER Web site (http://www.fda.gov/cder/
warn/) contains all notices of violation and warning
letters sent by either DDMAC or FDA headquarters
from January 1997 through December 2001 (under
the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), the FDA
is required to post all notices of violation and
warning letters sent to pharmaceutical companies)
[15]. All letters on the Web site (n = 642) were
downloaded and printed, and all warning letters
and notices of violation that pertained to US-based
advertising and promotional activities of pharma-
ceutical companies (n = 569) were included for
further analysis. Both warning letters and notices of
violation were included, as both types of commu-
nication result from the same review process [16].
Letters pertaining to manufacturing site inspections
or good laboratory practice (n = 49), investigator-
or sponsor-related problems (n = 16), IRB issues
(n = 4), and sales of illegal drugs by foreign com-
panies in the United States (n = 4) were not included
for further analysis.
Data Abstraction Form
A data abstraction form (available from the authors
upon request) was developed by reading a sample
of letters to understand their basic content and 
then by pilot-testing the form on a sample of 
letters. Background information collected on the
form includes reviewer information (i.e., reviewer
initials and date of review), company and drug
information (e.g., name of company, NDA of
drug(s) cited, product name), and type of letter (e.g.,
warning letter or untitled letter). The form also
includes categories of media cited for violations 
and the target audience (e.g., print advertisements
directed to professionals, print advertisements
directed to consumers, brochures directed to pro-
fessionals, brochures directed to consumers, letters
to professionals, sales aids, presentations/sales
pitches, Web sites, press releases, and television
commercials). If a letter cited brochures and/or
print advertisements but did not specify whether
professionals or consumers were the target audi-
ence, we assumed that the materials were directed
to professionals.
Information collected about economic violations
included the media cited for economic violations,
target audience for advertisement, subtitle of para-
graph describing the economic violation, type of
violation, key phrases in the letter, and supporting
evidence (e.g., AWP, published sources, data on ﬁle).
We considered six types of false or misleading
claims based on public remarks from FDA ofﬁcials
(categories 1–5) [5] and our pilot-testing experience
(category 6):
1. Unsupported comparative claim of effectiveness,
safety or interchangeability;
2. Implied claims of cost-savings to a broader audi-
ence than applicable;
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3. Claims of cost savings when there are obvious
additional costs that may affect cost savings;
4. Cost comparisons of dosages that are not 
comparable;
5. Claims that encouraged switching based on
lower price when there may be risks associated
with the switch;
6. Other misleading price comparisons.
Because no published descriptions of types of QOL
violations were found, we did not include any 
predetermined categories of QOL violations on 
the data collection form. Rather, four open ﬁelds,
in which to transcribe key sentences describing the
violations, were included. QOL violations were
subsequently categorized into the following three
categories:
1. Lack of substantial evidence for QOL claims;
2. Promoting QOL claims for an investigational or
unapproved drug;
3. Selective presentation of QOL information.
None of the FDA letters we reviewed used 
the term “patient-reported outcomes” (PROs) to
describe QOL violations [17]. To be consistent with
language in the letters, only “QOL” was used to
describe these types of violations.
Data Abstraction and Analysis
One author (KAS) reviewed each letter and entered
all data onto an electronic form developed in
Microsoft Access 2000. The other author (PJN)
reviewed a sample of letters, including all letters
citing economic and QOL violations. Identiﬁcation
of economic and QOL violations was based on
either subtitles or key words within letters that
described economic or QOL violations. Examples
of subtitles identifying economic violations include
“cost claims” [18], “misleading economic claims”
[19], and “misleading pharmacoeconomic claims”
[20]. Key words used to identify economic 
violations in letters without subtitles include 
“cost-effectiveness,” “cost,” “pricing,” and
“expenditure.” Examples of subtitles describing
QOL violations include “unsubstantiated quality-
of-life claims” [21], “misleading health-related
quality-of-life claims” [22], and “quality-of-life
claims” [23]. For those letters without identifying
subtitles, keywords used to identify QOL violations
in letters were “quality-of-life” and “well-being.”
We purposefully used a narrow deﬁnition of QOL
keywords to avoid confusion with clinical outcomes
related to functioning and to exclude claims related
to satisfaction.
We report frequency of economic and QOL vio-
lations, as well as Fisher’s exact test to determine
whether the proportion of violations differed over
the study time frame. Statistical analyses were con-
ducted using Microsoft Excel (Microsoft Corpora-
tion, Seattle, WA) and Stata (v. 7, 2000; Stata
Statistical Software, College Station, TX, USA).
Results
Of the 569 letters reviewed, 522 (92%) were notices
of violation and 47 (8%) were warning letters.
From 1997 through 2001, 28 (4.9%) letters includ-
ing 24 notices of violation and 4 warning cited false
and/or misleading economic claims (Table 1).
During the same period, 28 (4.9%) letters includ-
ing 27 notices of violation and one warning cited
false and/or misleading QOL claims (see Table 1).
Four of the letters contained citations for both
violative economic and QOL claims. There was no
signiﬁcant difference in the proportion of violations
for economic claims over time (Fisher’s exact test,
P = .45), but there was a signiﬁcant difference in
QOL violations (Fisher’s exact test, P = .028).
The most common economic violation involved
an “unsupported comparative claim of effective-
ness, safety, or interchangeability” (n = 14), 
followed by “claims of cost savings when there are
obvious additional costs that may affect cost
savings” (n = 9), and misleading price comparisons
(n = 5) (Table 2). Appendix A contains direct quotes
from selected FDA letters describing the nature of
the violations.
Table 3 reports the most common reasons cited
for QOL violations including “lack of substantial
evidence for QOL claims” (n = 15), “promoting
Table 1 Warning letters and notices of violation for economic and quality of life (QOL) claims (1997–2001)
Total No. of letters
by year (n) 1997 (145) 1998 (164) 1999 (109) 2000 (82) 2001 (69) Total (569)
No. (%) with 8 (5.5) 5 (3.1) 5 (4.6) 7 (8.5) 3 (4.3) 28 (4.9)
economic violations
No. (%) with QOL 5 (3.5) 5 (3.1) 3 (2.8) 7 (8.5) 8 (11.6) 28 (4.9)
violations
Note: Fisher’s exact test for economic violations, P = 0.4480; Fisher’s exact test for QOL violations, P = 0.0279.
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QOL claims in investigational or unapproved drug”
(n = 10), and “selective presentation of QOL infor-
mation” (n = 3). Appendix B provides direct cita-
tions from several letters detailing the nature of
these violations.
Together, violations for economic and QOL
claims were found most frequently in brochures
(17.9% of all letters with economic and/or QOL
violations), on Web sites (12.5%), and in letters
which did not specify the media of the promotion
(i.e., “nonspeciﬁed” materials) (12.5%) as indicated
in Table 4.
Discussion
Our results demonstrate that the FDA has sought
to regulate promotional material containing unsub-
stantiated economic and QOL claims in recent
years.
Although reasons for economic violations varied,
almost 50% resulted from economic messages with
unsupported comparative claims of effectiveness,
safety, or interchangeability. These advertisements
could be problematic if they induce physicians and
patients to switch from a safer or more efﬁcacious
drug to a less safe or efﬁcacious drug based purely
on alleged cost savings or cost-effectiveness. For
example, in a warning letter sent to one company,
the FDA cited a television advertisement that “mis-
leadingly suggests that [a drug] is similar in effec-
tiveness to other cholesterol-lowering agents [. . .]
and that the only difference between these agents 
is cost.”[24] The letter further states that “[the
company] has not demonstrated that [drug . . .] is
comparable in effectiveness to these other agents 
for its indicated uses” [24]. Other letters to 
Table 2 Economic violations cited by DDMAC* in warning
letters and notices of violation (N = 28 letters)
Violation n (%)†
Unsupported comparative claim of 14 (50.0)
effectiveness, safety, or interchangeability
Claims of cost savings when there are obvious 9 (32.1)
additional costs that may affect cost savings
Implied claims of cost savings to a 3 (10.7)
broader audience than applicable
Cost comparisons of dosages that 2 (7.1)
are not comparable
Encouraged switch based on lower price when 0 (0.0)
there may be risks associated with the switch
Misleading price comparisons 5 (17.9)
*DDMAC, Division of Drug Marketing,Advertising, and Communications.
†Percentages add to more than 100% because 4 letters were categorized as
having more than one type of violation.
Table 3 QOL violations cited by DDMAC in warning letters
and notices of violation (N = 28 letters)
Violation n (%)
Lack of substantial evidence for QOL claims 15 (53.6)
Promoting QOL claims in investigational or 10 (35.7)
unapproved drug
Selective presentation of QOL information 3 (10.7)
Table 4 Economic and QOL violations in various media
Violation
Economic QOL Total
(N = 28 letters) (N = 28 letters) (N = 56 letters)
Medium n* (%)† n* (%)† n* (%)†
Brochures 6 (21.4) 4 (14.3) 10 (17.9)
Web sites 2 (7.1) 5 (17.9) 7 (12.5)
Nonspeciﬁed materials 5 (17.9) 2 (7.1) 7 (12.5)
Press releases 1 (3.6) 4 (14.3) 5 (8.9)
Homemade materials, nonspeciﬁed 3 (10.7) 1 (3.6) 4 (7.1)
Print ads, professionals 2 (7.1) 2 (7.1) 4 (7.1)
Sales aid 1 (3.6) 2 (7.1) 3 (5.4)
Presentations/sales pitches 0 (0.0) 3 (10.7) 3 (5.4)
Letter to professional 3 (10.7) 1 (3.6) 4 (7.1)
Formulary kit 2 (7.1) 1 (3.6) 3 (5.4)
Exhibit booth panels 0 (0.0) 2 (7.1) 2 (3.6)
Promotional card 2 (7.1) 0 (0.0) 2 (3.6)
Reprint articles or reprint carrier 1 (3.6) 1 (3.6) 2 (3.6)
Posters 0 (0.0) 1 (3.6) 1 (1.8)
Box 1 (3.6) 0 (0.0) 1 (1.8)
Teleconference 0 (0.0) 1 (3.6) 1 (1.8)
Slim jim 0 (0.0) 1 (3.6) 1 (1.8)
Patient starter kit 0 (0.0) 1 (3.6) 1 (1.8)
TV ads 1 (3.6) 0 (0.0) 1 (1.8)
*n is the number of times cited at least once in a letter.
†Percentages add to more than 100% because some letters were cited for more than one type of violation.
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pharmaceutical companies also cite pharmacoeco-
nomic claims where the efﬁcacy and/or outcomes of
different therapies are assumed incorrectly to be the
same [19,25,26] as well as cost comparisons based
on drugs with differing indications [27,28] and lack
of adequate evidence for economic claims [29,30].
Economic promotions based on drug price com-
parisons and overall costs of treatment are being
scrutinized by the FDA. For example, the FDA cited
several companies for misleading comparative
pricing analyses [31,32]. The FDA found these pro-
motions inappropriate because most purchasers
(i.e., consumers and managed care organizations)
face different drug prices and comparative price
claims in advertisements may not accurately reﬂect
actual cost to consumers [31,32]. In addition, the
FDA cited several companies for claiming that
overall cost savings would result from the use of
their drug when they failed to evaluate all pertinent
costs of therapy beyond drug acquisition costs
[20,33].
While the number of letters containing QOL vio-
lations is relatively low, we found a signiﬁcant
increase in the proportion of letters with QOL vio-
lations over time. This suggests that pharmaceuti-
cal companies may increasingly consider QOL a key
attribute on which to promote a product, and/or
that the FDA is becoming more vigilant in its over-
sight of QOL violations. The most frequent viola-
tion associated with QOL promotions was “lack of
substantial evidence for QOL claims.” For example,
an FDA letter to one company stated that “Materi-
als that claim that [a drug] can ‘enhance daily living’
or that it offers ‘quality control of symptoms for
daily living’ are considered to be false or mislead-
ing in the absence of adequate and well-controlled
studies using validated instruments to determine
beneﬁt to health-related quality of life” [23].
More than one-third of the letters with QOL 
violations cited pharmaceutical companies for pro-
moting improved QOL in unapproved or investiga-
tional drugs. The use of both off-label promotions
and promotions of unapproved or investigational
drugs have been the subject of much general debate
and controversy [34,35]. These data suggest that
QOL promotional claims need to be part of the 
discussion.
The third QOL violation apparent in the letters
was “selective presentation of QOL information.”
For example, the FDA cited one company for
“present[ing] only the signiﬁcant ﬁndings for two of
six health related domains but fail[ing] to include
the results for the four domains with nonsigniﬁcant
ﬁndings” [36]. Although the least frequent QOL
violation, it is potentially the most troubling as it
underscores the difﬁculty in measuring and deﬁning
QOL in a meaningful way. In particular, there may
be some confusion about which levels of health
status measures are required to substantiate QOL
claims. Ongoing discussions between FDA and
industry to better deﬁne and understand QOL out-
comes may help to clarify these issues in the future
[34].
In general, more direction regarding the appro-
priate role and use of economic and QOL claims in
drug promotions may be helpful. Currently, regu-
lators and pharmaceutical companies face some
uncertainty about what constitutes a nonviolative
economic or QOL claim because there are no
formal guidelines detailing what constitutes a vio-
lation, nor what level of substantiating evidence is
required. The FDA continues to review issues
related to economic and QOL claims on a case-by-
case basis [5]. Development of guidelines for eco-
nomic and QOL promotions along with examples
of appropriate and inappropriate claims may help
minimize the confusion and controversy about
requirements for substantiating evidence and poten-
tially reduce the number of violations.
There are several limitations to this study. First,
we have no data on the total number of submissions
of promotional materials to DDMAC, nor the
number of these submissions that are actually
reviewed by the FDA. We also have no data on
regular correspondence between DDMAC and
pharmaceutical companies that did not result in
either a notice of violation or a warning letter, as
this type of information is not collected by the FDA
(L. Burke and L. Palmer, personal communication,
DDMAC, August 6, 2001). It was sometimes difﬁ-
cult to determine, based on details provided in the
letters, whether the target audience for advertise-
ments consisted of physicians, decision makers 
in managed care organizations, pharmacists, other
professionals, or consumers. Further research on
the audience targeted by the claims would be useful.
Also, we took a conservative approach in deﬁn-
ing QOL violations and did not include citations for
false and misleading claims pertaining to attributes
such as patient satisfaction and/or functioning. 
As noted, we also did not ﬁnd any reference to
“patient-reported outcomes,” a relatively new term
being used to describe information collected from
patients (e.g., QOL, functional status, treatment
satisfaction) during clinical trials [17]. We also
cannot draw any conclusions about overall trends
in economic and QOL advertising and promotion,
based solely on an analysis of regulatory letters. In
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particular, promotions cited for violations may be
different from promotions not cited for violations.
In the future, it would be helpful to explore other
issues, such as whether a relationship exists between
competition within a class of drugs and/or time
since launch and use of misleading economic and
QOL claims as when a drug company launches a
new drug belonging to an established class of drugs
and may promote its drug aggressively, thereby
increasing the likelihood of using unsubstantiated
or misleading economic and/or QOL claims. Fur-
thermore, a better understanding of the precise 
evidence used to substantiate economic and QOL
claims may also provide insights into problematic
claims. It also would be useful to understand
whether economic and QOL claims are developed
by marketing departments, by outcomes research
departments, or jointly. Ongoing analysis of these
and other issues pertaining to promotion of eco-
nomic and QOL attributes of drugs would help
both industry and regulators to set mutually under-
standable guidelines for promoting drugs based on
such end points.
This study was funded by Harvard Center for Risk
Analysis, Harvard School of Public Health, Boston, MA,
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Appendix A
Selected Examples of Economic Violations
Cited by DDMAC in Warning Letters and
Notices of Violation
1. Unsupported comparative claim of effectiveness,
safety or interchangeability
“In the absence of substantial evidence that
demonstrates that the treatment effects are com-
parable, the product cost comparisons are 
misleading.”
“. . . misleading because it implies that [a drug]
is equally safe, effective and interchangeable with
[competitor] for the doses compared.”
“. . . the misleading impression that [drug’s] costs
to the customer or pharmacy will be lower than
competitor’s at every dose or that its indications are
the same as comparator drugs”
“. . . it implies economic superiority based on the
assumption that the outcomes of the different ther-
apies are the same.”
“The relative costs of [drug] to other cholesterol
lowering agents is the focus . . . this focus, coupled
with the misleading suggestions that these products
provide comparable clinical beneﬁt, suggests that
that [drug] is the preferred cholesterol lowering
treatment.”
2. Claims of cost-savings when there are obvious
additional costs that may affect cost savings
“These claims imply that all costs associated with
therapy have been evaluated, not simply the acqui-
sition price of the drug.”
“These claims are misleading because they
suggest, without adequate evidence, that [drug]
reduces the overall cost of care in treating patients
with BPH.”
“. . . there may be additional costs incurred for
laboratory tests and ofﬁce visits because of the need
to titrate the dose of [drug].”
“. . . misleadingly suggest that [drug] positively
impacts medical costs and productivity loss, when
such has not been demonstrated by adequate 
evidence.”
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3. Implied claims of cost savings to a broader audi-
ence than applicable
“. . . misleading because retail pricing varies
from community to community and may affect cost
savings to patients.”
“. . . misleading without the addition of context
to clarify that the prices presented may not reﬂect
actual prices paid by consumers or pharmacies.”
4. Cost comparisons of dosages that are not 
comparable
“. . . patients . . . are not likely to understand
that they may need a different dose of [drug] in
order to obtain the same effect, and that this dif-
ference may reduce any potential savings.”
5. Misleading price comparisons
“. . . comparative pricing claims are misleading
because they lack adequate context . . . The cost-
effectiveness claim is misleading because the claim
is not supported by reference to AWP.”
“The comparative price/cost conclusion of a
‘47% difference’ is misleading because the above
price/cost comparison is based on an undeﬁned time
frame and therefore the conclusion of a 47% dif-
ference suggests a greater savings than what is sup-
ported by AWP data.”
“DDMAC considers the headline regarding
generic prices that references a table with only one
generic drug to be misleading.”
Appendix B
Selected Examples of QOL Violations Cited
by DDMAC in Warning Letters and Notices
of Violation
1. Lack of substantial evidence for HRQL claims
“[Company’s] broad claim of ‘patient well-being’
is not supported by substantial evidence and is
therefore misleading.”
“. . . false or misleading in the absence of ade-
quate and well-controlled studies using validated
instruments to determine beneﬁt to health-related
quality of life . . . The tagline ‘quality control’ is
false or misleading because it is used out of context
and can be interpreted to mean, without adequate
substantiation, that [drug] can control health-
related quality of life.”
“. . . suggests, without adequate evidence, that
[drug] improves quality of life.”
“. . . not supported by substantial evidence.
There have been no adequate and well-controlled
studies examining the potential of [drug] to improve
quality of life for patients or their families.”
“. . . [Company] claimed that patients using
[drug] demonstrated ‘improvement in well-being’ 
. . . DDMAC objected to this claim . . . because the
questionnaire did not meet the substantiation
requirements for health-related quality of life
claims.”
“The [drug] formulary kit . . . suggests that treat-
ment with [drug] has a positive effect on the HQRL
of IBS patients. These representations are mislead-
ing because they are not based on substantial evi-
dence, and overstate the efﬁcacy of [drug] on the
HRQL of IBS patients.”
“Health-related quality of life claims such as
these require substantial supporting evidence in the
form of adequate and well-controlled studies
designed to speciﬁcally assess these outcomes.”
2. Promoting QOL claims in investigational or
unapproved drug
“. . . [Company] is promoting [drug] as a safe
and effective drug prior to its approval . . . [e.g., ]
‘[drug] provides statistical improvement in physical
performance, mental skills, etc., and in the constel-
lation of activities we call medically, the quality of
life.’”
“. . . you make several superiority claims . . .
these claims include . . . ‘signiﬁcantly greater
increase in mean overall global improvement score
at weeks 8 and 12’ . . . These superiority claims for
[drug] are false or misleading because the safety and
efﬁcacy of [drug], an unapproved new drug, has not
been established.”
“[Company] has engaged in promotional activi-
ties that state or suggest that [drug] is safe and ef-
fective for use in treating multiple myeloma
[unapproved indication]. [Company] has also rep-
resented to physicians that [drug] can . . . promote
a feeling of ‘general well-being’ in these same
patients.
3. Selective presentation of QOL information
“[Company] has selectively presented only those
quality of life parameters that suggest that [drug] is
more effective than [competitor] in the treatment of
osteoarthritis, omitting those parameters where the
results for the 2 drugs were similar.”
“. . . misleading selective presentation or
“cherry-picking” of quality of life (QoL) data, and
unsubstantiated asthma-speciﬁc quality of life
claims for [drug] . . . ”
“[Company] presents only the signiﬁcant ﬁnd-
ings for 2 of 6 health related domains but fails to
include the results for the 4 domains with non-
signiﬁcant ﬁndings.”
